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PERDOMO v. HOLDER: THE CONTINUING 
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE CONCEPT OF 
A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
Corey Sullivan Martin* 
Abstract: Qualifying for asylum requires that an applicant be considered 
a refugee. In order to qualify, an applicant bears the burden of demon-
strating persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particu-
lar social group. Often, gender-based asylum claims can only proceed un-
der the particular social group category. The Ninth Circuit’s recent deci-
sion in Perdomo v. Holder highlights the court’s struggle to identify a 
coherent and workable definition for a particular social group and the 
consequent adverse effect on gender-based asylum claims. This Comment 
explores the Ninth Circuit’s definition of a particular social group as well 
as the Board of Immigration Appeals’ conflicting definition. By examin-
ing Perdomo in light of these divergent definitions, this Comment demon-
strates the need for clarification so that confusing and unnecessary lan-
guage does not continue to create problems for deserving applicants. 
This Comment ultimately concludes that the Ninth Circuit should adopt 
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ definition in order to provide greater 
consistency and clarity in asylum law. 
Introduction 
 Even if a woman can gain the sympathy of an Immigration Judge 
(IJ) for having been raped, mutilated, and repeatedly beaten, she may 
not find refuge in the United States.1 It is often the case that a woman 
is not targeted for such heinous crimes because of her race, religion, 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908–10, 914, 920 (B.I.A. 1999) (denying the 
asylum application of a woman because she could not define an acceptable social group, 
despite the fact that she was repeatedly sodomized, raped, and beaten by her husband). In 
2009, roughly fourteen years after the applicant, Rody Alvarado Pena, first filed for asylum, 
the Department of Homeland Security filed a one-paragraph brief indicating that she was 
eligible for asylum as a discretionary matter. See Sarah Rogerson, Waiting for Alvarado: How 
Administrative Delay Harms Victims of Gender-Based Violence Seeking Asylum, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 
1811, 1812, 1823 (2009). Acquiescing to the Department of Homeland Security, the IJ 
granted asylum without even issuing an opinion; thus undercutting any precedential value 
the grant of asylum might have. See id. at 1823. 
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nationality, or political opinion.2 Unless she can show her persecution 
is a result of her membership in a particular social group (PSG), there-
fore, she will not be granted asylum in the United States and the hor-
rific stories she will be forced to share will, in the end, mean nothing.3 
What will satisfy the definition of PSG?4 Oftentimes, it is impossible to 
tell.5 
 Although the United States holds itself out as a beacon of hope and 
opportunity to those seeking refuge, the country has struggled to pro-
vide consistent and uniform standards for the treatment of refugees.6 
Recognizing this deficiency in asylum law, the United States enacted the 
Refugee Act of 1980, officially adopting the definition of “refugee” first 
codified in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees.7 This Convention articulated the five categories—race, re-
                                                                                                                      
2 See id. 
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); see also R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 914, 919–20 
(finding that, although the applicant’s injuries proved persecution, the harm inflicted was 
not on the basis of a statutorily protected ground). 
4 Compare R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917 (“‘Guatemalan women who have been involved 
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under 
male domination’ is not a particular social group.”), with id. at 935 (Guendelsberger, J., 
dissenting) (“Social groups may be defined more or less broadly depending upon the level 
of generality of the defining characteristics . . . . [The IJ] could have legitimately broad-
ened the perspective to include all Guatemalan women or, possibly, all married Guatema-
lan women as the particular social group.”). 
5 See B.J. Chisholm, Comment, Credible Definitions: A Critique of U.S. Asylum Law’s Treat-
ment of Gender-Related Claims, 44 How. L.J. 427, 432–33 (2001) (“Confusion surrounding 
the contours of the social group definition has resulted in asylum applicants proposing a 
broad range of group definitions, as they attempt to assign words and boundaries to their 
experiences of persecution.”); see also Sarah Hinger, Finding the Fundamental: Shaping Iden-
tity in Gender and Sexual Orientation Based Asylum Claims, 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 367, 
376–78 (2010) (arguing that courts deny asylum when the prior persecution is based solely 
on applicants’ gender). 
6 See, e.g., Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102, 102; Refugee 
and Asylum Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,116, 45,116 (Sept. 10, 1981) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pts. 207, 209). The Refugee Act of 1980 specifically declared that “the historic policy of the 
United States [was] to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in 
their homelands . . . .” Refugee Act of 1980 § 101(a). Congress further asserted that the 
purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 was “to provide a permanent and systematic procedure 
for the admission to this country of refugees . . . .” Id. § 101(b). Unfortunately, as recently 
as 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice, in proposed revisions to regulations governing 
establishing asylum, continued to stress the need for clearer standards and more systematic 
procedures because the current system does not “address[] consistently through the ad-
ministrative adjudication and judicial review process” the interpretation of the refugee 
definition. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 46 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (Dec. 7, 
2000). 
7 See Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)); Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinaf-
ter Refugee Convention]. 
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ligion, nationality, political opinion, and particular social group—under 
which an applicant can qualify as a refugee.8 If an applicant cannot show 
that persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution is based on his or 
her inclusion in one of the five statutorily protected categories, he or 
she is not considered a refugee and does not qualify for asylum.9 The 
Refugee Act’s main objective was to create a workable test to determine 
who qualifies as a refugee; however, thirty years later that objective is far 
from accomplished.10 
 The failure to achieve a workable test is especially apparent in the 
struggle to define the concept of PSG.11 Without guidance from either 
international or domestic law, courts have struggled to find a consistent 
and manageable definition of what constitutes a PSG.12 Although this 
lack of clarity presents obstacles to all petitioners who file PSG-based 
asylum applications, those bringing gender-based asylum claims have 
been particularly burdened.13 Women, for example, are frequently per-
secuted simply because they are women.14 Because gender is not a sta-
                                                                                                                      
8 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(A)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(transposing the protected categories in the Refugee Convention into United States fed-
eral law). 
9 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(A)(2). 
10 See Refugee and Asylum Procedures, 46 Fed. Reg. at 45,116, 45,116; Leonard Bird-
song, “Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe 
Free of Sexual Persecution . . .”: The New Grounds for Grants of Asylum, 32 Nova L. Rev. 357, 
368–69 (2008) (“Problems and inconsistencies prevail in asylum adjudication for a number 
of reasons, including lack of definitions for certain statutory words.”). 
11 See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238–39 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[N]either the legislative his-
tory of the relevant United States statutes nor the negotiating history of the pertinent in-
ternational agreements sheds much light on the meaning of the phrase ‘particular social 
group.’”). 
12 See id.; Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575–76 (9th Cir. 1986) (conceding 
the general lack of guidance from both legislative history and international law on the 
issue of PSG, making it difficult for the court to define the concept); In re Acosta, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 211, 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985) (relying on a purely linguistic analysis because both 
Congress and the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees provide 
little clarity with respect to the definition of a PSG); Chisholm, supra note 5, at 432; Zsaleh 
E. Harivandi, Note, Invisible and Involuntary: Female Genital Mutilation as a Basis for Asylum, 
95 Cornell L. Rev. 599, 606 (2010) (noting that the courts have been “largely responsi-
ble” for developing a definition of PSG but that the definition differs between circuits); see 
also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [he-
reinafter Protocol to the Refugee Convention] (removing some language from the defini-
tion of refugee, which alluded to the events that occurred during and leading up to World 
War II in Europe, but providing no additional insight into applying the definition). 
13 See Chisholm, supra note 5, at 432–34. 
14 See id. at 429; see also Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum 
Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 777, 781–82 (2003) 
(noting that “women are often persecuted for their gender” and arguing that gender not 
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tutorily protected category, however, persecuted female applicants must 
find a way to define themselves as part of a PSG.15 Without consistent 
standards, they have little guidance to prepare an optimal case.16 
 The development of two divergent definitions of PSG has been 
particularly problematic for gender-based asylum claims.17 In In re Acos-
ta, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) established a workable de-
finition of PSG.18 In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, however, the Ninth Circuit 
undermined the clarity Acosta provided, resulting in over ten years of 
inconsistent application of the PSG concept.19 The court’s recent deci-
sion in Perdomo v. Holder demonstrates the continuing impact of Sanchez-
Trujillo on gender-based asylum claims in the Ninth Circuit.20 
  Despite the lingering effects of the language in Sanchez-Trujillo, 
Perdomo may finally provide clear guidance to the Ninth Circuit, the 
BIA, and ultimately, prospective applicants with respect to PSG-based 
asylum claims.21 This Comment argues that Perdomo may cause the 
Ninth Circuit to abandon its two-prong definition of PSG and instead 
adopt the definition articulated by the BIA in Acosta. Part I discusses the 
background of asylum law in the United States, including the policy 
                                                                                                                      
being one of the five protected categories creates a significant barrier for female asylum 
applicants). 
15 See Chisholm, supra note 5, at 429; see also Harivandi, supra note 12, at 606; Musalo, 
supra note 14, at 781–82. 
16 See Chisholm, supra note 5, at 432. 
17 See James H. Martin, Case Note, The Ninth Circuit’s Review of Administrative Questions of 
Law in the Immigration Context: How the Court in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS Ignored Chevron 
and Failed to Bring Harmony to “Particular Social Group” Analysis, 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 159, 
165–66, 180–82 (2001) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s failure to adhere to the analysis in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and refusal to accept the defini-
tion of a PSG promulgated by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) would result in 
“disparate treatment” of asylum seekers). 
18 See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34. 
19 See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576; Martin, supra note 17, at 173, 177, 181; see also 
Michael G. Daugherty, Note, The Ninth Circuit, the BIA, and the INS: The Shifting State of the 
Particular Social Group Definition in the Ninth Circuit and Its Impact on Pending and Future Cas-
es, 41 Brandeis L.J. 631, 638–39, 658 (2003) (“[Acosta and Sanchez-Trujillo] represent al-
ternative and conflicting definitions of the same legal standard. As a result, Ninth Circuit 
asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group have been measured by a 
different standard often resulting in unfavorable outcomes.”). 
20 See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2010); Martin, supra note 17, at 
181–82. 
21 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668 (responding to the BIA’s decision that “all women in 
Guatemala” was “overly broad” and a “mere demographic division” that could not consti-
tute a PSG, and clarifying that a group is not too broad if it has an innate characteristic); R-
A-, 22 I & N. Dec. at 919 (“But the social group concept would virtually swallow the entire 
refugee definition if common characteristics, coupled with a meaningful harm, were all 
that need be shown.”). 
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reasoning for its implementation, the applicable statutes, and the agen-
cies involved in defining and applying asylum law. Part II analyzes the 
courts’ varying interpretations of PSG and the manner in which these 
interpretive inconsistencies have left gender-based claims especially 
vulnerable. In discussing the two landmark cases—Acosta and Sanchez-
Trujillo—which have attempted to create a coherent definition for a 
PSG, Part II also demonstrates why the definition in Acosta should pre-
vail. Finally, Part III uses Perdomo to exhibit the dramatic effects of the 
Ninth Circuit’s conflicting definitions on asylum cases, particularly 
gender-based claims. More importantly, it argues this case should and 
will finally reduce the influence of Sanchez-Trujillo. 
I. Background of Asylum Law: To Whom Does the United States 
Grant Asylum and for What Reasons? 
 Immigration is a controversial topic in a post-September 11th 
world where immigrants are perceived as threats to the security and 
economy of their host countries.22 Right or wrong, a direct conse-
quence of this perception has been a diminution of the United States’ 
willingness to accept the world’s huddled masses.23 Yet, in the Refugee 
Act of 1980, Congress declared that “it is the historic policy of the Unit-
ed States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecu-
tion in their homelands . . . .”24 The struggle to balance “providing hu-
manitarian assistance under international agreements and domestic 
law” with limiting abuse and providing for national security continues 
in the application of asylum law in the United States.25 
 The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the Immigration and National-
ity Act in order “to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Andorra Bruno, Cong. Research Serv., RL 31269, Refugee Admissions and 
Resettlement Policy 2 (2010) (“In the aftermath of [the September 11, 2001] attacks, a 
review of refugee-related security procedures was undertaken, refugee admissions were 
briefly suspended, and enhanced security measures were implemented. As a result of these 
and other factors, actual refugee admissions plunged . . . .”); Karen Musalo, Protecting Vic-
tims of Gender Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y 
& L. 119, 130–31 (2007) (“[T]he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have hardened 
attitudes and increased xenophobia. All of this has translated into measures for greater 
militarization of the border, and expanded authority to deport or remove undocumented 
immigrants while affording them with a minimum of procedural rights.”); Daugherty, su-
pra note 19, at 633, 656–58. 
23 See Bruno, supra note 22, at 2; Musalo, supra note 22, at 130–31; Daugherty, supra 
note 19, at 633, 656–58; All Things Considered: Emma Lazarus, Poet of the Huddled Masses 
(NPR radio broadcast Oct. 21, 2006). 
24 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102. 
25 Daugherty, supra note 19, at 632–33. 
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the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian con-
cern to the United States . . . .”26 The Refugee Act defines a refugee as a 
person who, owing to “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion,” cannot or will not return to or 
avail himself or herself of the protections of his or her country of na-
tionality or country in which he or she last resided.27 In order to qualify 
for asylum, a refugee must show the following: (1) the harm inflicted 
constituted persecution; (2) the incident was on the basis of “one of the 
statutorily protected grounds;” and (3) the persecution was carried out 
“by the government or forces the government is either ‘unable or un-
willing’ to control.”28 
 Applicants are heard before an IJ for the Department of Justice’s 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).29 If the application is 
denied, the case can be appealed to the BIA.30 As part of the EOIR, the 
BIA has appellate jurisdiction over all asylum cases nationwide.31 After 
an adverse ruling by the BIA, the applicant can then appeal the BIA’s 
decision to the federal circuit courts of appeals.32 The circuit court with 
jurisdiction over the location in which the original application was filed 
hears the appeal.33 
                                                                                                                      
26 Refugee Act of 1980 § 101(b); see Bruno, supra note 22, at 1. 
27 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
28 Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 795 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Navas v. INS, 
217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
29 Ruth Ellen Wasem, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32621, U.S. Immigration Policy 
on Asylum Seekers 1 (2010). Aliens in the United States can apply for asylum with the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau in the Department of Home-
land Security; however, if an alien is in the process of removal proceedings, then the alien 
would be required to seek asylum before an IJ. Id. Under the first path, which is consid-
ered an affirmative application, asylum officers evaluate applicants in non-adversarial in-
terviews. See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. Citizenship & Immig. Services 
(Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f61 
41 76543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=e3f26138f898d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD. The asylum 
officers either grant asylum to successful applicants or refer those who fail to the IJs. See 
Wasem, supra, at 8. Under the second path, where applicants are applying on the defensive 
during removal proceedings, IJs hear the applicants exclusively. Id. 
30 See Wasem, supra, at 8. 
31 Birdsong, supra note 10, at 365–66. Regulations promulgated by the Attorney General 
created the BIA; it was not formed directly by statute. See id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) 
(2010). 
32 See Birdsong, supra note 10, at 366. 
33 Id. If a circuit court of appeals adopts a new rule, the BIA is expected to apply the 
rule in cases filed in that circuit. Id. Courts of appeals, however, are also expected to show 
deference to BIA standards when interpreting federal legislation. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). Chevron counsels, 
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II. Defining a Particular Social Group 
A. The Basic Problem 
 Courts have experienced great difficulty developing a consistent 
and manageable interpretation of a PSG that grants asylum to those that 
deserve it without being over inclusive.34 The definitional problems are 
partly due to the lack of domestic or international input on the con-
tours of the PSG concept.35 The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees did not define the term, nor did the Refugee Act of 1980.36 
 The confusion surrounding the definition of PSG has produced 
devastating consequences for potential applicants.37 If an applicant 
cannot fit into one of the statutorily protected categories, the extent of 
his or her persecution is irrelevant and he or she does not qualify for 
asylum.38 The risk of misconstruing a group of which the applicant is a 
                                                                                                                      
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . . If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpreta-
tion. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute. 
Id. In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, the Supreme Court held that the decision in Chevron applied 
to the interpretation of the INA. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); Mar-
tin, supra note 17, at 171. The expectation of deference provides further support for the 
argument that the Ninth Circuit should explicitly overrule its two-prong definition of PSG 
and adopt the BIA’s definition from Acosta. See infra Part III. 
34 See Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Chi-
sholm, supra note 5, at 432–35; Daugherty, supra note 19, at 638. 
35 See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575–76 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he ‘social 
group’ category is a flexible one which extends broadly to encompass many groups who do 
not otherwise fall within the other categories of race, nationality, religion, or political opin-
ion. Still, the scope of the term cannot be without some outer limit.”); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 211, 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985) (noting that the PSG category was included in the definition 
of refugee “in order to stop a possible gap in the coverage of the U.N. Convention”). 
36 See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1575–76; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232; see also Refugee 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codifying PSG as a protected 
category in United States asylum law but failing to define it); Protocol to Refugee Conven-
tion, supra note 12, art. 1. (failing to provide clarification on the definition of PSG). 
37 Chisholm, supra note 5, at 432 (“Confusion surrounding the contours of the social 
group definition has resulted in asylum applicants proposing a broad range of group defi-
nitions, as they attempt to assign words and boundaries to their experiences of persecu-
tion.”). 
38 See Harivandi, supra note 12, at 604; see also In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 914, 919–
20 (B.I.A. 1999) (finding that, although the applicant’s injuries proved persecution, the 
harm inflicted was not on the basis of a statutorily protected ground). 
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member can be the difference between life and death.39 As a result, 
applicants deploy various formulations of their PSG in an attempt to 
“hit the bull’s-eye” with a narrow and specific enough definition.40 Over 
time, the many and varied attempts to frame a proper definition have 
made it even more difficult for advocates and asylum-seekers to under-
stand what is necessary to define a PSG.41 
 Such confusion has especially affected gender-based claims.42 Fe-
male victims of persecution have submitted applications for asylum only 
to be denied because they cannot articulate an acceptable PSG.43 They 
possess an immutable characteristic in that they are female; however, 
for United States asylum law, that is currently insufficient.44 Conse-
                                                                                                                      
39 See Juarez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 235 F. App’x 361, 362–63, 369 (7th Cir. 2007) (remand-
ing a case due to an inability or refusal to determine if “young, poor Guatemalan women” 
constituted a PSG, even after hearing a woman’s testimony about being raped repeatedly, 
impregnated twice, beaten, and receiving numerous death threats by a neighbor fifteen 
years her senior,); Allison W. Reimann, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women Flee-
ing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, U. Pa. L. Rev. 1199, 1261–62 (2007) (arguing that regula-
tory changes supporting the notion that gender alone constitutes a PSG is necessary to 
protect female asylum seekers from persecution). 
40 See Chisholm, supra note 5, at 432. 
41 See id. at 432–33, 435. 
42 See id. at 433–34. 
43 See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 664–66 (9th Cir. 2010); R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 
914, 919–20; Reimann, supra note 39, at 1201–02. 
44 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666–67. The courts have been reluctant to recognize women, 
without additional defining characteristics, as a PSG in large part because of the fear of 
opening the floodgates to female asylum seekers. See id.; Reimann, supra note 39, at 1201. 
This floodgate argument has been expressly rejected by the United Nations; it is also un-
supported by empirical data from Canada, a country that has allowed gender to constitute 
a PSG for over ten years. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Sexual and Gender-
Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: 
Guidelines for Prevention and Response 118 (2003) [hereinafter UNHCR Guide-
lines], available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=3ed 
cd0661; Monica Boyd, Gender Aspects of International Migration to Canada and the United States 
4 (presented at the International Symposium on International Migration and Develop-
ment, Turin, Italy, June 28–30, 2006), http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/ 
turin/Symposium_Turin_files/P08_Boyd.pdf. In response to reasoning that the size of a 
group can be used as a basis for refusing to recognize women as a PSG, the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees explicitly states that “the argument has no basis in fact or rea-
son, as the other grounds are not bound by this question of size. There should equally be 
no requirement that the particular social group be cohesive or that members of it volun-
tarily associate.” UNHCR Guidelines, supra, at 118. In addition, Canada has recognized 
claims based on gender since 1993. Boyd, supra, at 4. As of December 31, 2002, the Immi-
gration and Refugee Board of Canada heard a total of 2331 gender-related claims and only 
accepted 1345. Id. From 1997 to 2002, the total worldwide population of refugees and 
persons “of concern” to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees hovered around twenty 
million, with females accounting for roughly half of that figure. 2003 Global Refugee Trends: 
Overview of Refugee Populations, New Arrivals, Durable Solutions, Asylum-Seekers and Other Per-
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quently, women are forced to make attempt after attempt to define 
themselves into a PSG in order to receive asylum protection from gen-
der-based persecution.45 
B. BIA and Ninth Circuit Attempts to Create a Workable Definition 
 Both the Ninth Circuit and the BIA have been vocal contributors in 
judicial attempts to define a PSG.46 Unfortunately, both have failed to 
generate a consensus that is a workable construct.47 The field remains 
riddled with “a plethora of definitions, tests, and factors for establishing 
a social group, [creating] an uncertain backdrop for applicants with 
gender-based claims.”48 
 Two landmark cases, Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, decided by the Ninth 
Circuit, and In re Acosta, decided by the BIA, created definitions that 
remain pertinent in the Ninth Circuit.49 Whereas Acosta brought clarity 
and precision to the matter, Sanchez-Trujillo created an unnecessary and 
confusing barrier for legitimate asylum applicants.50 Consequently, the 
Ninth Circuit should overrule its definition of a PSG and adhere to the 
BIA’s definition from Acosta.51 
 In Acosta, decided prior to Sanchez-Trujillo, the BIA thoroughly ad-
dressed the grounds for obtaining asylum.52 In so doing, it defined a 
PSG as a “group of persons[,] all of whom share a common, immutable 
                                                                                                                      
sons of Concern to the UNHCR, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 2, 5 ( June 15, 2004), 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=40d015fb4&query= 
refugees%20by%20numbers%202003.pdf. Despite its recognition of gender-based asylum 
claims, Canada certainly was not flooded with the approximately ten million potential 
female refugees during that period. See id. 
45 See Chisholm, supra note 5, at 432–33, 435. 
46 See id. at 435. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. 
49 See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; Daugherty, supra 
note 19, at 658. 
50 See Martin, supra note 17, at 173, 181–82 (“Unfortunately, regardless of the basis for 
its decision, the Ninth Circuit made substantive legal changes to the policy of the BIA 
where such changes were neither necessary nor warranted. The perverse result of this 
decision is that it will likely increase the potential for disparate treatment of asylum seek-
ers.”); see, e.g., Ochoa v. Gonzalez, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying asylum 
based on language from Sanchez-Trujillo by stating that the social group was “too broad” 
instead of applying the definition in Acosta). 
51 See Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1196–97; Martin, supra note 17, at 181; see also UNHCR 
Guidelines, supra note 44, at 118 (“There should equally be no requirement that the par-
ticular social group be cohesive or that members of it voluntarily associate . . . .”). 
52 See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 218–35. 
44 Boston College Third World Law Journal Vol. 31: E. Supp. 
characteristic.”53 The immutable trait is one “that either is beyond the 
power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental to his [or 
her] identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be 
changed.”54 The BIA stressed that the PSG is determined on a case-by-
case basis; however, “[t]he shared characteristic might be an innate one 
such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be 
a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land 
ownership.”55 
 In Sanchez-Trujillo, however, the Ninth Circuit stated that a PSG was 
“a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actu-
ated by some common impulse or interest.”56 The court further de-
clared, “Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary associational 
relationship among the purported members, which imparts some 
common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a mem-
ber of that discrete social group.”57 
 Furthermore, the court articulated certain circumstances in which 
an applicant would fall beyond the purview of a PSG.58 The court de-
cided that the group, distinguished as “young, working class, urban 
males who have failed to serve in the military or actively support the 
government” of El Salvador, was outside the boundaries of a PSG.59 The 
Ninth Circuit denied the applicant’s PSG formulation because “such an 
all-encompassing grouping . . . simply is not that type of cohesive, ho-
mogeneous group to which . . . the term ‘particular social group’ was 
intended to apply.”60 The court elaborated that the consequence of al-
lowing such a broad formulation “would be tantamount to extending 
refugee status to every alien displaced by general conditions of unrest 
or violence in his or her home country.”61 The Ninth Circuit agreed 
with the IJ that including such a “sweeping demographic division [that] 
naturally manifest[s] a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, 
diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings . . . would render the 
definition of ‘refugee’ meaningless.”62 
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. at 233. 
54 Id. at 234. 
55 Id. at 233. 
56 Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1576–77. 
59 Id. at 1577. 
60 Id. 
61 Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577. 
62 Id. 
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 In comparison to the BIA’s definition of PSG in Acosta, which is 
relatively clear and appropriately broad, the Sanchez-Trujillo formulation 
is vague and complicated.63 Under Acosta, an applicant can define a 
PSG by showing he or she “share[s] a common, immutable characteris-
tic” with others.64 Gender seems to fall easily within this definition.65 As 
Perdomo v. Holder demonstrates, however, language from Sanchez-Trujillo 
can be used to prevent asylum seekers, who experience gender-related 
persecution, from making out a cognizable claim for asylum in the 
Ninth Circuit.66 Furthermore, in Ninth Circuit cases, the BIA has taken 
language from Sanchez-Trujillo even when it purports to rely on its own 
definition of a PSG from Acosta.67 
                                                                                                                      
63 See id. at 1575–77; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; Martin, supra note 17, at 173, 181–
82 (“The definition of a ‘particular social group’ established by the BIA set reasonable 
requirements for individuals seeking asylum in the United States.”). The language in San-
chez-Trujillo evaluating the limits of a PSG in part based on the size of the group, the cohe-
siveness of its members, and the voluntary relationship among its members is in direct 
conflict with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees’ understanding of the PSG con-
cept, which expressly rejects of all three notions as a basis for evaluating PSGs. UNHCR 
Guidelines, supra note 44, at 118. Ironically, the Ninth Circuit looked to international law 
for guidance when originally defining a PSG in Sanchez-Trujillo and noted the unfortunate 
lack of insight. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1575–76. Now that such guidance exists, the 
court continues to adhere to its language in conflict with not only the BIA definition, but 
also current international guidelines. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; UNHCR Guide-
lines, supra note 44, at 118. 
64 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. Currently, however, gender alone is not an acceptable 
PSG. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666 (“Whether females in a particular country, without any 
other defining characteristics, could constitute a protected social group remains an unre-
solved question for the BIA.”). 
65 See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 44, at 118 (“It fol-
lows that sex can properly be within the ambit of the social group category, with women 
being a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics 
. . . .”). 
66 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668; see also R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 919. Indeed, the Sanchez-
Trujillo language has repeatedly been used when arguing that an applicant is outside the 
boundary of a PSG. See, e.g., Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668; Ochoa, 406 F.3d at 1170–71 (“Business 
persons targeted by drug traffickers are analogous to the young, working class men of mili-
tary age that this court found were not a social group in Sanchez-Trujillo.”); Kripalani v. 
Gonzales, 128 F. App’x 653, 655 (9th Cir. 2005) (“While persons who become informants 
may share some common impulse or interest, the differences among informants far out-
weigh the similarities.”); De Valle v. INS, 901 F.3d 787, 793 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The social 
group in which De Valle claims membership—families of deserters—is by no means closely 
affiliated or discrete.”) 
67 See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918; see also Daugherty, supra note 19, at 651 (noting that 
the BIA will cite its definition of a PSG to Acosta, but will rely on the standard from Sanchez-
Trujillo to reject the group as being outside of a PSG); Martin, supra note 17, at 173, 175–
81 (noting generally how the Ninth Circuit “effected a change in the asylum policy” that 
will “likely increase the potential for disparate treatment of asylum seekers”). The BIA 
decision in R-A- “marked a low point in . . . recognition of gender-based persecution claims 
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 Ironically, while the BIA continues to shy away from the broader 
definition in Acosta by using language from Sanchez-Trujillo, the Ninth 
Circuit has shifted away from its definition in Sanchez-Trujillo and to-
ward an interpretation more in line with Acosta.68 In the 2000 case of 
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, the Ninth Circuit attempted to harmonize the 
two definitions from Sanchez-Trujillo and Acosta.69 The resulting defini-
tion was that a PSG “is one united by a voluntary association, including 
a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamen-
tal to the identities or consciences of its members that members either 
cannot or should not be required to change it.”70 This definition ap-
pears to be broader than the Acosta formulation in that it has an extra 
prong; however, the impact of the second prong has not brought clar-
ity.71 Rather than overruling the decision in Sanchez-Trujillo and accept-
ing the BIA’s definition of a PSG, the court definitively embraced the 
holding in Sanchez-Trujillo.72 As a result, the Ninth Circuit struggles to 
reconcile a broader interpretation of PSG with its own precedent in 
Sanchez-Trujillo.73 
III. Perdomo v. Holder: More of the Same or a Bit of Clarity? 
 Perdomo v. Holder is a perfect example of the difficulties the Ninth 
Circuit continues to face when attempting to distinguish Sanchez-Trujillo 
                                                                                                                      
under the category of membership in a particular social group.” Daugherty, supra note 19, 
at 643. Although it did not directly cite Sanchez-Trujillo, it is worth noting that the decision 
arose in the Ninth Circuit and the section discussing societal visibility as a requirement was 
labeled “[c]ognizableness.” See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917–18; Daugherty, supra note 19, at 
654. In Sanchez-Trujillo, the first prong of the four-part test to establish eligibility for a par-
ticular social group was “whether the class of people identified by the petitioners is cogni-
zable as a ‘particular social group’ . . . .” Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574. Furthermore, in 
R-A-, the reasoning behind requiring applicants to show some threshold level of “cog-
nizableness” as a group was that “the social group concept would virtually swallow the en-
tire refugee definition if common characteristics, coupled with a meaningful level of harm, 
were all that need be shown.” R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 919. This rationale was extremely 
similar to the reasoning for limiting the PSG decision in Sanchez-Trujillo. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 
801 F.2d at 1577. Lastly, the dissenting opinion in R-A- distinguished Sanchez-Trujillo. See R-
A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 933–35 (Guendelsberger, J., dissenting). 
68 See Daugherty, supra note 19, at 649–50; see also Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 
1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ll alien homosexuals are members of a ‘particular social group’”); 
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000); supra notes 66–67 and 
accompanying text. 
69 See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093; Daugherty, supra note 19, at 649–50. 
70 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093. 
71 See id.; supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text; see also Martin, supra note 17, at 
181–82. 
72 See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1092; Martin, supra note 17, at 179–82. 
73 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666–68. 
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from other cases with respect to the concept of PSG.74 It also demon-
strates the manner in which the court’s decision in Sanchez-Trujillo ne-
gatively impacts gender-based claims.75 
 Lesly Yajayra Perdomo requested asylum in 2004 based on mem-
bership in a particular social group.76 Perdomo searched for appropri-
ate terminology to establish membership in a PSG.77 She first articulated 
her group as “women between the ages of fourteen and forty.”78 The IJ 
changed her group to “women between the ages of fourteen and forty 
who are Guatemalan and live in the United States . . . .”79 Although the 
court deemed credible her testimony about the atrocities that occur in 
Guatemala, the IJ declined to qualify the group as a PSG.80 On appeal, 
the BIA agreed that the group was “too broad to qualify as a protected 
social group.”81 When Perdomo attempted to revise her group to “all 
women in Guatemala,” the BIA concluded that it was a mere “demo-
graphic rather than a cognizable social group . . . .”82 The language the 
court used to analyze a PSG came straight from Sanchez-Trujillo.83 
 The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether “women in Guate-
mala” constituted a PSG.84 The court began with a very loaded caveat: 
“Whether females in a particular country, without any other defining 
characteristics, could constitute a protected social group remains an 
unresolved question for the BIA.”85 The court admitted that the case 
law examining asylum claims continues to evolve; it nevertheless main-
tained the two-prong test from Hernandez-Montiel combining the defini-
tion from Sanchez-Trujillo with the definition from Acosta.86 The court 
then remanded the case because of the BIA’s failure to apply the Her-
nandez-Montiel two-prong approach properly.87 Consequently, the lan-
                                                                                                                      
74 See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666–68 (9th Cir. 2010); Chisholm, supra note 5, 
at 480; Martin, supra note 17, at 181–82. 
75 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 666–68; Chisholm, supra note 5, at 480; Martin, supra note 
17, at 181–82. 
76 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 664. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 665. 
80 See id. 
81 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 665. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at 668; Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986). 
84 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668. 
85 Id. at 666. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. at 669. 
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guage from Sanchez-Trujillo continues to be misconstrued and inconsis-
tently applied.88 
 Despite failing to give direct insight into whether gender qualifies 
as a PSG, the analysis in Perdomo may nevertheless minimize the debili-
tating impact of the Sanchez-Trujillo language on potential applicants.89 
The Ninth Circuit stated in Perdomo, “To the extent we have rejected 
certain social groups as too broad, we have done so where ‘[t]here is no 
unifying relationship or characteristic to narrow th[e] diverse and dis-
connected group.’”90 The court then highlighted that it has recognized 
“innate characteristics of such broad and internally diverse social 
groups as homosexuals and Gypsies . . . .”91 The effect of this distinction 
is that the language from Sanchez-Trujillo, which attempted to prevent 
over-inclusiveness, should no longer apply to groups with an innate 
characteristic.92 Consequently, the BIA can no longer end the analysis 
                                                                                                                      
88 See id. at 668–69; Daugherty, supra note 19, at 639, 651. 
89 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668–69 (clarifying that the court rejects groups for being too 
broad when there is not an innate characteristic “to narrow the diverse and disconnected 
group”); In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917–20 (B.I.A. 1999); Daugherty, supra note 19, at 
651. Compare Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude 
that Mohamed’s claim that she was persecuted ‘on account of’ her membership in a social 
group, whether it be defined as the social group comprised of Somalian females, or a more 
narrowly circumscribed group, such as young girls in the Benadiri clan, not only reflects a 
plausible construction of our asylum law, but the only plausible construction.”), with Ka-
rouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Though the issue presented in 
Hernandez-Montiel was narrowly cast to encompass only ‘gay men with female sexual identi-
ties in Mexico,’ . . . Hernandez-Montiel clearly suggests that all alien homosexuals are mem-
bers of a ‘particular social group’ . . . . Thus, to the extent that our case-law has been un-
clear, we affirm that all alien homosexuals are members of a ‘particular social group’ 
. . . .”), and Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e con-
clude that the ‘particular social group’ in this case is comprised of gay men with female 
sexual identities in Mexico.”). The Ninth Circuit’s avoidance of its own language in Mo-
hammed v. Gonzales seems to demonstrate its continued hesitancy to place gender under 
the rubric of PSG. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 798. 
90 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668 (quoting Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 
2005)). 
91 Id. 
92 See id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned as follows: 
To the extent we have rejected certain social groups as too broad, we have 
done so where ‘[t]here is no unifying relationship or characteristic to narrow 
th[e] diverse and disconnected group.’ In Ochoa, the court determined that 
‘business owners in Colombia who rejected demands by narco-traffickers to 
participate in illegal activity” was too broad because such a group had neither 
a voluntary relationship nor an innate characteristic to bond its members. 
Most recently, in Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder . . . we noted that the proposed social 
group, ‘returning Mexicans from the United States,’ was similar to the types 
of large and diverse social groups we considered in Ochoa and Sanchez-Trujillo, 
which we concluded were too broad to qualify as cognizable social groups be-
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by stating that gender is merely a demographic rather than a PSG.93 
Because gender is an innate characteristic, it sufficiently narrows a “‘di-
verse and disconnected group.’”94 
 Finally, the Perdomo court reiterated its rejection of “the notion that 
a persecuted group may simply represent too large a portion of a popu-
lation to allow its members to qualify for asylum.”95 In Singh v. INS, the 
court noted that the IJ determined that Singh and his family were not 
persecuted because “a majority of the Indian population remaining in 
Fiji” had endured the same treatment.96 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
“reject[ed] the notion that an applicant is ineligible for asylum merely 
because all members of a persecuted group might be eligible for asy-
lum.”97 Just as Indo-Fijians being half of the population in Fiji did not 
disqualify Singh from asylum, similarly Perdomo cannot be disqualified 
based on the “the size and breadth of a group alone . . . .” 98 
Conclusion 
 The Ninth Circuit is hindering the asylum process by maintaining 
its two-prong analysis of a PSG rather than adopting the Acosta defini-
tion. Despite many opportunities to decide otherwise, the Ninth Circuit 
continues to support a definition of a PSG that harmonizes its Sanchez-
Trujillo decision with the BIA’s formulation in Acosta.  Unfortunately, 
the language from Sanchez-Trujillo has been repeatedly used to disqual-
ify applicants by placing them outside the boundaries of any protected 
category. This language has been particularly burdensome on appli-
cants attempting to assert gender-based claims for asylum because gen-
der does not fit within the definition of PSG. 
 Despite failing to give direct insight into whether gender is a PSG, 
the principles announced in Perdomo should assist gender-based asylum 
claims. First, Perdomo indicates that the language often used by the BIA 
from Sanchez-Trujillo no longer applies to groups with an innate charac-
                                                                                                                      
cause they shared neither a voluntary relationship nor an innate characteris-
tic. 
Id. Thus, Perdomo stands for the proposition that the language of Sanchez-Trujillo does not 
come into play if there is an innate characteristic to “bond [a group’s] members.” See id. 
93 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668; R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 933–35 (Guendelsberger, J., dis-
senting). 
94 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668; R-A-, 22 I & N. Dec. at 906, 919 (majority opinion). 
95 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 669. 
96 See Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1996). 
97 Id. at 1359. 
98 See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 669. 
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teristic. Second, the court applied the holding in Singh, where the statu-
torily protected category was race, to its PSG analysis in Perdomo, poten-
tially allowing gender-based claims as well. 
 The conclusions drawn in Perdomo will assist applicants with innate 
characteristics in avoiding disqualification due to the potential size of 
the group of asylum-seekers. Furthermore, Perdomo could ultimately 
and rightfully push the BIA to accept that gender, without any distin-
guishing factors, is a legitimate particular social group. 
